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I. Executive Summary
In March 2010, the FCC released the National Broadband Plan,
an initiative to dramatically increase broadband access for U.S.
consumers. As part of the plan, the FCC articulated a desire to
reallocate large amounts of electromagnetic spectrum to mobile
broadband use. The FCC’s desire to reallocate spectrum from
existing uses raises significant questions about the rights of the
existing FCC license holders of that spectrum.
The largest block of potentially available spectrum that is
economically and technologically viable to reallocate to mobile
broadband use is the 294 Mhz allocated to broadcast television.
Regulators find the potential reallocation of broadcast television
spectrum appealing insofar as this spectrum is relatively inefficiently
used. Approximately 90% of U.S. households do not receive their
broadcast television programming through the broadcast spectrum,
but instead from cable, satellite, or an increasing variety of Internetbased services. Moreover, only 17% of the television broadcasting
spectrum is used nationwide. As a result, the government seeks to
reacquire 120 Mhz of the broadcasters’ 294 Mhz and redeploy it for
mobile broadband applications.
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Legal claims to property rights in the spectrum are highly
tenuous, likely allowing the government to reclaim the broadcasters’
spectrum without compensation at the end of their license periods.
Nevertheless, the government has announced several times that it
plans to conduct the transition of television broadcast spectrum on a
voluntary basis. This decision is based on a variety of political and
strategic considerations that compel the government to seek an
equitable solution. However, to the extent the process is indeed
voluntary—that the broadcasters will not be forced to give up their
licenses—the government is essentially recognizing even greater
possession rights for the broadcasters than owners of private property
traditionally enjoy. Typically, owners of private property are subject
to government seizure for public benefit in return for market-rate
1
compensation for their loss. Voluntary return of spectrum, however,
would put the broadcasters in a better position as the government is
suggesting they will have the opportunity to reject the government’s
proposed compensation.
In any event, treating the spectrum rights as having elements of
private property raises questions about how the government will
compensate the broadcasters for their loss of spectrum rights. In
determining appropriate compensation, the government may adopt
principles from rezoning and eminent domain actions. If the
government cannot reach a voluntary settlement with the
broadcasters, it will likely have to turn to traditional takings strategies
whereby the government takes control of private property on a nonvoluntary basis. Insofar as rezoning and eminent domain are the
government’s “next best option” to a voluntary deal, these principles
will likely provide a significant backdrop to the negotiation process to
obtain a voluntary agreement.
Although zoning would potentially allow the government to
acquire the broadcasters’ licenses at low rates, it is also problematic.
If the government simply “rezones” the broadcasters’ permitted use
of their spectrum license from television to mobile broadband, the
broadcasters will undoubtedly argue that they are entitled to the new
zoning rights. If the broadcasters were to prevail on this argument,

1. Despite the numerous announcements from various government sources that the
spectrum reallocation process would be voluntary for television broadcasters, the extent to
which the process will actually be completely voluntary is still somewhat murky. In order
to obtain large swaths of contiguous nationwide spectrum, and deal with holdout
broadcasters in certain markets, the government will likely need to force certain
broadcasters to give up their spectrum in some markets. This point is likely to be a highly
contentious part of any plan to reacquire broadcasters’ spectrum.
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they would obtain the entire benefit from the conversion, leaving no
benefit for the U.S. taxpayers. On the other hand, if rezoning simply
prevents the broadcasters from using their spectrum for broadcasting
purposes, they would lose all return on their investment in their
licenses. The government could also reduce the broadcasters’ license
rights via “downzoning” the spectrum to limit its use without
compensation. Any of these zoning approaches would likely result in
an extreme result favoring one side, most likely the government, as
opposed to an equitable incentive process balancing the competing
interests of the broadcasters and society as a whole.
However, eminent domain may be an efficient and principled
method of reallocation that provides a viable framework for
negotiating a buyout price for the television broadcasters. Under the
eminent domain approach, the government would purchase the
broadcasters’ licenses at the fair market value of the loss it causes
their current businesses. The loss to broadcasters could be largely
mitigated if the FCC is able to overcome potential First Amendment
challenges and grants the foreclosed broadcasters permanent
transmission rights for their content on cable and satellite platforms.
For a relatively modest sum, the government could provide the 10%
of viewers in affected areas currently relying on over-the-air
broadcasting with a subsidized cable or satellite television
subscription consisting of only the local broadcast channels to
minimize loss of television access for current over-the-air viewers.
A well-crafted eminent domain strategy would not only
compensate television broadcasters for their economic losses, but
would also allow them to remain in business and continue to serve
their local communities with their content, thus also minimizing
disruption to consumers. The threat of rezoning, meanwhile,
provides the government with a “stick” to encourage the broadcasters
to agree to reasonable terms to vacate their spectrum. After
compensating the broadcasters for their partial business loss of the
10% of viewers they reach with over-the-air transmission, the
government would be able to re-auction the broadcasters’ spectrum
for higher-value mobile broadband usage. It would realize a net
profit of approximately $28.5 to $38.3 billion after compensation to
the broadcasters and subsidized cable or satellite subscriptions for
affected viewers. In addition, this reallocation would provide the
bandwidth needed to unleash a huge expansion of mobile broadband
in the United States and all of the accompanying social and economic
benefits, which some economists estimate to be many multiples of the
value of the spectrum itself.
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Although well-settled eminent domain law prevents payments
based on the increase in the value of the property for the
government’s higher-value intended future use, political pressures
may push the government to offer compensation to broadcasters
somewhat beyond the current market value of television broadcast
use. In addition, the threat of rezoning the broadcasters’ rights may
help constrain the upper boundary of any settlement to the
broadcasters. In this way, rezoning and eminent domain principles
may both inform the negotiations and help provide an equitable
outcome for the broadcasters and the U.S. taxpayers while preserving
incentives for communications operators to invest in FCC licenses
and build out of new services.

II. Introduction
2

Demand for mobile broadband applications is soaring, and the
FCC, which allocates spectrum for specific applications, believes that
3, 4
more spectrum should be allocated for this purpose.
This
conclusion is widely supported by industry observers. As part of the
recently released National Broadband Plan, the FCC is seeking to
reallocate 300 Mhz of spectrum over the next five years, and 500 Mhz
by 2020, to mobile broadband applications. Some industry observers
5
Many economists point to a
advocate even larger amounts.
multiplier effect where the social and economic benefits of broadband
6
deployment are many times the value of the project itself. The

2. Cisco predicts a twenty six fold increase in mobile data traffic between 2010 and
2015. Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2010–
2015, CISCO (Feb. 2011), http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/
ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-520862.html.
3. David Gardner, FCC Chair Cites ‘Spectrum Crisis’, INFO. WEEK (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/mobile/220301552?cid=nl_IW_daily_
html [hereinafter Spectrum Crisis].
4. In a speech on September 27, 2011, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski said,
“The spectrum crunch is the single biggest threat to one of the most promising parts of our
economy. There’s much we need to do to free up spectrum for mobile broadband . . .”
Grant Gross, Citigroup Questions Whether U.S. Spectrum Shortage Exists, COMPUTER
WORLD (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9220436 /Citigroup_
questions_whether_U.S._spectrum_shortage_exists?source=rss_networking&utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+computerworld%2Fs%2Ffe
d%2Ftopic%2F16+%28Computerworld+Networking+News%2.
5. CTIA paper suggested 800 Mhz is needed. See Comments of CTIA—The
Wireless Association NBP Public Notice #6, CTIA.ORG (Nov. 13, 2009), at 2,
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/filings/091023_CTIA_Comments_NBP_PN.pdf.
6. Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Munoz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum
Allocation Policies, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-28, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908717 [hereinafter Hazlett & Munoz].
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National Broadband Plan warns that failure to address spectrum
availability issues will lead to “higher prices, poor service quality, an
inability for the United States to compete internationally, depressed
7
demand and, ultimately, a drag on innovation.”
Numerous studies have documented the current inefficient
allocation of electromagnetic spectrum in the United States.
Nationwide, only about 17% of the available channel capacity in the
8
9
current allocation of 294 Mhz of VHF and UHF spectrum to
10, 11
12
is used for television broadcasting.
television broadcasters
Moreover, over 90% of consumers subscribe to cable or satellite
television services, leaving less than 10% of viewers exclusively
watching over-the-air television broadcasts. Thus, 294 Mhz of
valuable spectrum is dedicated for limited use (17% of the available
13, 14
channel capacity, used by 10% of the population).
As part of the

7. National Broadband Plan: Chapter 5 - Spectrum, BROADBAND.GOV, at 2–3,
www.broadband.gov/plan/5-spectrum [hereinafter Spectrum].
8. VHF television broadcasting frequencies: 54–72 Mhz (channels 2–4); 77–88 Mhz
(channels 5–6); 174–216 Mhz (channels 7–13).
9. UHF television broadcasting frequencies: 470–698 Mhz (channels 14–69; except
channel 37 between 608 and 614 Mhz, which is reserved for radio astronomy use). Prior to
June 2009, when television broadcasters converted to digital broadcasting and the
channels were “repacked,” the UHF band extended from 608 to 800 Mhz. The
frequencies 698 to 800 were used for channels 52–69. The 698–800 Mhz spectrum was
auctioned in 2008–2009 in an auction dubbed “The 700 Mhz Auction” officially known as
“Auction 73.” Until the 1980s, channels 70 through 83 existed and utilized 806–884 Mhz.
10. Phil Bellaria, Adam Gerson & Brian Weeks, Spectrum Analysis: Option for
Broadcast Spectrum, OBI Technical Paper No. 3, BROADBAND.GOV, at 7 (June 2010),
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-omnibus-broadband-initiative-(obi)-technicalpaper-spectrum-analysis-options-for-broadband-spectrum.pdf [hereinafter OBI Technical
Paper No. 3].
11. For comparison, the entire AM radio band occupies 1.2 Mhz of spectrum. See
Robert M. Rast, The Dawn of Digital Television, INSIDE SPECTRUM TECH. (Oct. 2005),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-electronics/audiovideo/the-dawn-of-digital-tv.
12. Thomas W. Hazlett, Unleashing the DTV Band: A Proposal for an Overlay
Auction, NBP PUBLIC NOTICE 26, at 5–6 (Dec. 18, 2009), http://iep.gmu.edu/event/
unleashing-dtv-band-proposal-overlay-auction-comment-nbp-public-notice-26 [hereinafter
Hazlett]. Hazlett’s calculation is 49 channel slots in 210 markets, or 10,290 available
channels exist, but only 1,750 full power television stations are licensed.
13. This unused “white space” is not contiguous and varies significantly by market.
14. The “Spectrum” report (Spectrum, supra note 6, at 7) includes a table valuing the
over-the-air subscribers as 14% to 19% of broadcasters’ total audience. However, the
widely accepted figure is close to 10% or less, which also matches Exhibit A on page 7 of
the same report citing a Nelson’s estimate. This seems to reflect the influence of the
broadcasting industry. While the broadcasting industry does not dispute that over 90% of
U.S. homes subscribe to cable or satellite, one of their representatives, argued that in
many cable and satellite homes, not all of the televisions are connected to cable and thus
actually about 14% of homes use at least some over-the-air broadcasting. Telephone
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National Broadband Plan, the FCC seeks to reallocate 120 Mhz of the
294 Mhz currently allocated to television broadcasting to mobile
15
broadband applications.
One of the largest challenges in accomplishing spectrum
reallocation is to determine how to divert spectrum from current
applications and how (or if) to compensate current licensees of that
spectrum. Another challenge to clearing television broadcasters from
the electromagnetic spectrum is the potential deprivation of television
16
services to the small percentage of U.S. households that rely
exclusively on over-the-air broadcasting.
Notwithstanding the substantial challenges involved in any plan to
reallocate the spectrum to allow it to be used for higher value
applications, such reallocation is widely expected to provide
economic and social benefits to society as a whole. However, in order
to effect this reallocation, the FCC must determine an appropriate
mechanism for doing so. The FCC must consider the rights of the
current spectrum holders, television viewers, and U.S. taxpayers as
well as political considerations and implications for longer term
government policy. Given the scarcity of spectrum and the ease of
verifying who is using it, many policy makers have argued that,
generally speaking, spectrum licenses should be awarded with full
explicit property rights to incentivize their most valuable possible
17, 18
However, FCC licenses do not grant property interests, and
use.
the government likely has the right to simply allow the licenses to

Interview with John K. Hane, Counsel, Pillsbury, Winthrup, Shaw & Pittman (June 21,
2010).
15. Spectrum, supra note 7.
16. Approximately 11 million of the 114 million U.S. homes. See Dennis Haarsager,
Over-the-air TV Households: the Real Number from TVB, TECH. 360 (June 14, 2010),
http://technology360.typepad.com/technology360/2011/06/over-the-air-tv-householdsthereal-numbers-from-tvb-pubmedia.html.
17. Thomas W. Merrill engages in an expanded discussion of the conditions that
often lead to the creation of property rights for regulated items. See Thomas W. Merrill,
Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 280 (2000).
18. The idea that private property-based market allocation of spectrum would yield
the most efficient allocation for society have been most notably advocated by Ronald
Coase in his seminal article.
See Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) [hereinafter Coase]. This idea is not fully accepted
and has been rebutted by others. See, e.g., David Moss & Michael Finn, Radio Regulation
Revisited: Coase, the FCC, and the Public Interest, 389 J. POL’Y HIST. 15 (2003). The latter
paper argues that auctions do not capture the value of “public interests” such as the value
of society having universal communication access or the value of improvements to
democracy that occur as a result of greater communication, but only captures value that
results from profit-making uses.
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expire and then re-auction the spectrum for their higher value use in
19
mobile broadband applications.
Despite the lack of a legal requirement to compensate the
television broadcasters, the government is heavily motivated to do so.
This is due to a combination of political pressure from the
broadcasters, the government’s desire to encourage FCC license
holders to invest in offering advanced new services on their spectrum,
and the desire to maximize revenue at spectrum auctions. If the
government were to set a precedent of not compensating the
television broadcasters for their reasonable expectations of
continuous renewal, this would likely cause uncertainty about the
rights associated with FCC spectrum licenses. Future bidders for
FCC spectrum licenses would likely bid less for licenses and be more
reluctant to invest aggressively in new services based on those
licenses. On the other hand, any compensation for broadcasters
potentially increases the costs for the U.S. government dramatically.
As a result, there is considerable tension over how (or even if)
broadcasters should be compensated for their loss of spectrum rights
when the spectrum is cleared for mobile broadband use. Ultimately,
the government has strong political and strategic incentives to
develop an equitable solution with the broadcasters in any spectrum
reallocation process as opposed to scoring a clear “win” over them.
Accordingly, the government will likely seek to propose a mutually
acceptable solution to clear the broadcasters off the spectrum.
This article analyzes the nature of interests television broadcasters
hold in their FCC spectrum licenses, and analyzes options for
spectrum reallocation that minimize the potential inequities facing
television broadcasters, viewers and U.S. taxpayers. The article will
also evaluate existing proposals from economic, public policy, and
practical perspectives. Finally, it will propose an alternate framework
based on traditional property law principles that considers the
challenges and costs to the government of reclaiming the spectrum.
The proposed solution would fairly compensate the broadcasters and
affected viewers, and would enable the government to realize
substantial revenue from re-auctioning the spectrum for mobile
broadband use.

19. J. Armand Musey, Broadcasting Licenses: Ownership Rights and the Spectrum
Rationalization Challenge, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV., Vol. 13 (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1952138 [Hereinafter Ownership Rights].
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III. Nature of the Broadcast Spectrum Reallocation Challenge
The challenges in spectrum reallocation can largely be divided
into three categories. The first challenge relates to protecting the
viewing public from the possibility of significantly reduced television
viewing options. The second challenge is a question of how (or if) to
minimize harm to broadcasters by their spectrum loss. The third
challenge is to protect the interests of the U.S. taxpayers in realizing
the economic value of additional broadband spectrum. These
interests are somewhat intertwined. It is instructive to examine each
component of these interests individually.
A. Broadcasters’ Spectrum Serves a Fraction of Their Viewers

A broadcasting license comprises two primary rights. The first is
the right to broadcast television over a specified frequency, and the
second is the right to require cable and satellite systems in the local
area to rebroadcast their programming on their systems. Although
somewhat counterintuitive, most of the television broadcasters’ value
lies not in over-the-air broadcasting, but rather from retransmission
via satellite and cable. Over-the-air broadcasting accounts, on
20
average, for less than 10% of television viewers and has been slowly
declining for several years. Federal law requires cable companies to
retransmit local broadcasters’ programming in their broadcast areas
21
via the so-called “must-carry” rules. Similarly, the Satellite Home
Viewer’s Act (“SHVA”) requires satellite television companies to
retransmit all local broadcasts in the markets where they retransmit
22
any of them. Thus, a reallocation process that would preserve mustcarry rights (on both satellite and cable) could allow most of the
broadcasters whose spectrum is reclaimed to remain in business and
serve their communities.
1.

Congressional Involvement is Necessary for Equitable Solution

One complication of preserving must-carry rules for broadcasters
who return their licenses is that Congress would have to both modify
23
the current must-carry regime that is codified in the 1992 Cable Act,
20. See Spectrum, supra note 7, at n.87 (referencing a Neilson’s estimate of 9.7% for
the percentage of Americans who view over-the-air programming exclusively).
21. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (2011) and 47 C.F.R. § 64 (2011) for “must carry” rules.
22. For a summary of the Satellite Home Viewers’ Act, see FED. COMMC’NS
COMM’N, The FCC’s Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act Page, http://transition.fcc.
gov/mb/shva/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
23. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102385; 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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and authorize a mechanism for the FCC to pay the broadcasters to
return their spectrum. This might be challenging, as members of
Congress may not be eager to enter into the process of reclaiming
television broadcasting licenses. Many politicians strive to remain in
good standing with their local broadcasters who have significant
flexibility in granting them airtime under the guise of “news” without
24
violating equal coverage rules. However, Congress may have little
choice but to get involved if the FCC is not able reach an agreement
with the broadcasters as consumer demand for additional mobile
25
broadband spectrum is strong, experts are warning that delays in
26, 27
and the U.S. Treasury is
allocating it would hurt the economy,
undoubtedly eager for the additional revenue that auctioning the
28
spectrum for mobile broadband would raise. Absent congressional
legislation, the FCC’s only viable option to reallocate the spectrum
would be to use a “zoning approach” (described in Section IV. A.
infra) to either upgrade the broadcasters to authorize mobile
broadband use on their spectrum or to attempt to rezone it so that
their rights expire at the end of their licenses. The former would be
an enormous give away of government assets, while the latter would
impede other government objectives necessitating an equitable
solution with the broadcasters.
B. First Amendment Issues May Prevent Continued Must-CarryRegulation

Must-carry rules have allowed broadcasters to remain relevant
and profitable despite the dramatic decline in over-the-air television
viewership. There is a question as to whether those rules can be
separated from the broadcasting licenses themselves and still
withstand a First Amendment challenge. Specifically, the courts may
not accept a government strategy of lowering its costs of
compensating the broadcasters by preserving must-carry rights for
broadcasters whose spectrum it reclaims. If the courts do not allow
this strategy, the cost of reacquiring broadcasters’ licenses may

24. Election Coverage and Equal Time, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N,
http://www.rtnda.org/pages/media_items/election-coverage-and-equal-time1600.php (last
visited Oct. 30, 2011).
25. Stacy Higginbotham, Spectrum Shortage will Strike in 2013, GIAOM (Feb. 17,
2010), http://gigaom.com/2010/02/17/analyst-spectrum-shortage-will-strike-in-2013/.
26. Spectrum Crisis, supra note 3.
27. Hazlett, supra note 6.
28. Estimates of how much such an auction would raise vary significantly, usually
between $20 billion and $60 billion. See Section V.B. infra for a further discussion of this
topic.
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increase significantly and/or the viewing options for more viewers
may decline.
1.

Turner I and II Support Must-Carry on Limited Grounds

The Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Turner Broadcasting
29
Systems v. FCC, held that must-carry rules did not violate the First
Amendment because they were based not on the broadcasters’
content, but rather on their use of over-the-air broadcasting
technology. The Court noted:
It is true that must-carry provisions distinguish between
speakers in the television market. But they do so based only
upon the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to
viewers, and not upon the messages they carry . . . so long as
they are not subtle means of exercising a content preference,
speaker distinctions of this nature are not presumed invalid
30
under the First Amendment.
In essence, Turner I prioritized speech that is transmitted through
broadcast television over speech transmitted through other means. It
is not clear the broadcasters would enjoy this privileged position if
they no longer broadcast.
31
In a later must-carry case involving the same parties, Turner II,
the Court again upheld a must-carry regulation because it
“further[ed] an important government interest; and . . . did not
burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those
32
interests.” The government interest in question was to “guarantee
the survival of a medium that has become a vital part of the Nation’s
communication system, and to ensure that every individual with a
33
television set can obtain free television programming.” The Court
therefore concluded that the must-carry provisions are consistent with
34
the First Amendment. The Turner II decision confirmed that “mustcarry” provisions are allowable because they further an important
governmental interest so long as they do not burden substantially

29. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
30. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 645–46.
31. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997). This case was also a
5–4 decision (Breyer, J., Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, J., Souter, J., and Stevens, J. joined the
opinion of the Court. Ginsburg, J., O’Connor, J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J. dissented).
32. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
33. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 647.
34. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
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more speech than is necessary to further that interest. To meet this
standard, the broadcasters who surrendered their licenses would have
to show their continued existence is an important governmental
interest even after they ceased broadcasting.
2.

Breyer’s Turner II Concurring Opinion May Support Continued
Must-Carry for Former Broadcasters

In Turner II, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion emphasized the
public interest in must-carry regulation. Justice Breyer’s concurrence
was built, in part, on the Court’s earlier decision in Red Lion Broad.
36
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, the Court upheld an FCC
determination that it could require a broadcaster to provide air time
for a person to respond to a personal attack made on the
broadcaster’s news program. The Court held that broadcasters
37
merely had First Amendment “interests” and “[i]t is the rights of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
38
paramount.” The Court also noted that “[t]here is nothing in the
First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
39
voices.” As a consequence, the Court ruled that the FCC could
regulate the broadcasters’ news coverage to ensure balanced
programming on scarce licensed spectrum. Just as the Court in Red
Lion found that regulation was justified to ensure the public interest
in balanced news coverage, Justice Breyer’s Turner II concurrence
explained his belief that the must-carry statute’s main purpose was
“to assure the over-the-air public ‘access to a multiplicity of
40
information sources.’”
Continuation of must-carry requirements after the broadcasters
no longer broadcast over-the-air would be fully compatible with
Turner I and Turner II so long as Congress finds another equally valid
non-content based distinction to separate the broadcasters from
others. One such option would be the creation of “broadcasting
licenses” given to former broadcasters if they meet designated
content-neutral requirement(s). However, there is a risk the Court
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
663).

Id.
Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 389.
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at
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could find that such licenses are not valid because they privilege the
now former broadcasters’ content because of who they are (former
broadcasters) as opposed to “the manner in which the speakers
41
transmit their messages to viewers.”
Even without a non-content based distinction, however, mustcarry regulation for former broadcasters may still be compatible with
the Turner I and Turner II decisions if future courts adopt Justice
Breyer’s view that such regulation is justified because it furthers the
public interest in receiving information from multiple sources. A
court adopting this perspective would likely uphold continued mustcarry rules for former broadcasters so long as they do not burden
speech more than necessary to achieve an important government
objective.
The important government interest would be the
promotion of widespread access to local television content for cable
42
Local
and satellite subscribers as well as over-the-air viewers.
television broadcasters are a primary source of local news content for
many people, regardless of how they receive their television signals.
The benefits of diversity of content, particularly local content, could
not be fully maintained without keeping the current broadcasters in
business via transmission on cable and satellite systems. Accordingly,
must-carry requirements for former broadcasters could likely meet
the more stringent “intermediate scrutiny” standard of review
whereby the reviewing court must consider whether the statute
involves important governmental interests and whether the law is
substantially related to the achievement of important governmental
43
objectives.
3.

But Would Courts Uphold Must-Carry Today Under Any Circumstance?

The bigger question for the broadcasters is whether must-carry
44
regulation would be upheld today under any circumstance. Turner I
suggests must-carry regulation was designed specifically to protect

41. Turner I, 520 U.S. at 645.
42. In enacting spectrum reallocation legislation that includes must-carry rules for
non-broadcasting broadcasters, Congress could make a specific finding about the
importance of the government objective of promoting access to local broadcasting content.
43. Intermediate Scrutiny, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (defining
intermediate scrutiny).
44. See Petition for Writ of Certiori, Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 2010 WL 326554
(No. 09-901), cert. denied. Cablevision petitioned for writ of certiorari in this case seeking
to overturn must-carry regulation. Cablevision’s argument is largely that, based on
changes in the media industry, the original rationale for must-carry no longer applies.
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only those people who do not subscribe to cable television by
ensuring they had content:
Appellants contend, in this regard [that even non-contentbased must-carry rules have content implications], that the
must-carry regulations are content-based because Congress’
purpose in enacting them was to promote speech of a favored
content. We do not agree. Our review of the [Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition] Act and its various
findings persuades us that Congress’ overriding objective in
enacting must-carry was not to favor programming of a
particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to
preserve access to free television programming for the 40
45
percent of Americans without cable.
Any benefits of must-carry to cable and satellite subscribers are
not mentioned. Moreover, the value of protecting those who rely on
over-the-air broadcasting has greatly diminished. When Turner I was
decided in 1994, approximately 40% of U.S. households did not have
cable, and the percentage was not significantly lower in 1997 when
46
Turner II was decided. Today, the situation is quite different insofar
as approximately 90% of U.S. households presently subscribe to cable
or satellite systems and less than 10% rely exclusively on over-the-air
47
As a result, one of the primary justifications for
transmission.
upholding must-carry regulation has substantially diminished.
Moreover, the opinion of the Court in Red Lion and Justice
Breyer’s concurring opinion in Turner II represent the “public trust”
model of regulation whereby spectrum is held for the benefit of the
48
public. Krystilyn Corbett argues that the “public trust” model has
waned over time in favor of the “private market” model that gives
greater control of spectrum resources to license holders.
Additionally, given the diminishing number of over-the-air television
49
viewers and changes in the composition of the Supreme Court, must-

45. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 646.
46. Satellite as a comparable substitute to cable television was a very small part of the
broadcasting industry in 1994 as the high powered satellite television providers (the DBS
systems—DirectTV and EchoStar) did not begin service until after 1994.
47. Many industry observers suggest that, when piracy is included, approximately
95% of U.S. households have cable or satellite television service.
48. Krystilyn Corbett, The Rise of Property Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46
DUKE L.J. 611 (1996) [hereinafter Corbett].
49. The Turner I case was decided in a 5–4 decision and the majority included
Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Souter. Only Justice Kennedy

2012]

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE BROADCASTING SPECTRUM

159

carry regulation would probably not be upheld today unless the Court
were to find that its benefits extend to cable and satellite viewers by
providing them access to local content they would not otherwise have.
However, the Court may well reject this argument as part of a move
to a private market approach to spectrum regulation that would give
higher priority to the First Amendment rights of broadcasters than
50
previous Courts have done. Given the possible shift away from the
public trust model of spectrum regulation and the diminishing
number of over-the-air television viewers, it is not clear that Justice
Breyer’s concurring view in Turner II would be adopted by the Court
in a review of must-carry rules today.
If spectrum reallocation legislation resulted in must-carry rules
that include broadcasters who no longer broadcast over-the-air, the
satellite and cable companies would have an opportunity to re-litigate
the must-carry rules. Such litigation might allow the Court to
reconsider its decision without explicitly having to overturn Turner I
or Turner II. Finally, as explained below, the must-carry rules are
becoming less relevant as fewer broadcasters avail themselves of this
option. Because of the decreasing relevance of the must-carry rules, a
successful court challenge to these rights may not be a fatal blow for
the broadcasting industry. Rather, the industry may just have to
shrink somewhat, letting the majority who can survive without mustcarry do so. In the worst case, the cost of compensating the
51
broadcasters could rise to $15.2 billion. If the must-carry rules can
be preserved for broadcasters whose spectrum is reclaimed and can
remains on the Court today. The dissent included Justices Ginsburg, O’Connor, Scalia
and Thomas, all of whom except Justice O’Connor remain on the Court today. Turner II
was also a 5–4 decision with Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens affirming and
Justices Ginsberg, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting. As a whole, the justices of
today’s Court have a stronger private market perspective than those of the Turner era.
Court observers widely view today’s Court as less likely to uphold market regulation that
impinges on Constitutional rights (including First Amendment rights) of FCC licensees
than earlier Courts. Changes in the media marketplace could give the Court an
opportunity to revisit Turner I and Turner II and effectively nullify the decision without
explicitly overturning it.
50. The dissent in Turner II made it clear it viewed prioritization of certain types of
programming, such as local programming, as not being content neutral. Turner II, 520
U.S. at 235.
51. Economist Colemen Bazelon et al.’s detailed economic analysis conservatively
suggests the cost to buyout the affected broadcaster’s spectrum in a reverse auction
process would be approximately $14.4 billion plus $0.78 billion to repack the spectrum for
a total of $15.4 billion. Coleman Bazelon, Charles L. Jackson & Giulia McHenry, An
Engineering and Economic Analysis of the Prospects of Reallocating Radio Spectrum from
the Broadcast Band through the Use of Voluntary Incentive Auctions, TELECOMM. POLICY
RESEARCH CTR., 2, (Sept. 19, 2011) http://www.tprcweb.com/jdownloads/2011/Spectrum
%20Markets/tprc-2011-sm-3.pdf [hereinafter Bazelon II].
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also satisfy First Amendment concerns, they have the potential to
dramatically reduce the impact of broadcasters’ losing their spectrum
on both the broadcasters and their viewers.
One complication to a strategy of maintaining must carry rules for
television broadcasters who surrender their spectrum licenses is that
absent spectrum licenses, the broadcasters using cable and satellite
for distribution would naturally feel less secure about their
businesses. This is because future amendments in the law could deny
them retransmission rights on cable and satellite systems. These
concerns could be alleviated by a clear contract providing for
liquidated damages if the broadcasters’ retransmission rights on cable
and satellite were ever disrupted due to future changes in the law or
adverse court decisions.
C. Television Service Gaps Will Arise

If television broadcasters are cleared from the electromagnetic
spectrum, a small percentage of households which rely exclusively on
over-the-air broadcasting may never pay to subscribe to cable or
satellite television services. Accordingly, the question arises as to
whether spectrum reallocation will deprive these individuals of access
to television.
1.

Subsidized Cable or Satellite May Bridge the Access Gap

If Congress wanted to preserve off-the-air television viewers’
access to television as well as the television broadcasters’ over-the-air
audience, it could require purchasers of mobile broadband spectrum
to allow free access to a server containing on-demand content from
each of the broadcasters. This solution, however, is not likely to
work, as it would require too much bandwidth to individually stream
local broadcasts wirelessly. Of course, as wireless broadband
compression technology improves, this may someday become
possible, particularly in rural areas where more bandwidth is
available.
A more plausible solution, however, would be for the government
to subsidize a basic “local stations only” package for those viewers.
Almost every U.S. home has access to either cable or satellite service.
EchoStar and DirecTV offer local subscription packages for only
52
$5.99 a month. The cable systems have similar content costs as the
52. Based on the author’s personal knowledge, these are highly profitable services for
EchoStar and DirecTV at $5.99 per month with content costs averaging less than 25% of
revenue, but they are always sold in conjunction with a larger package. A “local channels
only” service is likely to be challenging from a billing and administrative perspective, but

2012]

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE BROADCASTING SPECTRUM

161

satellite providers. Based on a cost of $6.00 per month, and allowing
for the installation cost assumptions of $87.50 to reflect a 75/25
percent mix of cable and satellite (with higher installation costs for
satellite), a discount rate of 8 percent and 5% annual subscriber churn
would produce an estimate of approximately $9.7 billion to move all
over-the-air viewers to basic cable or satellite systems. However, as
described in Section V.A. below, only broadcasters in approximately
20% of the markets will be impacted. While those markets are more
densely populated, they are likely to have a lower percentage of over53
the-air viewership. Assuming, on balance, these markets also have
12% of the over-the-air viewers, the cost of moving them to cable or
satellite is reduced to $2.3 billion. (See Exhibit 1 below for sensitivity
analysis of the cost of subsidizing cable/satellite service for
subscribers currently receiving exclusively over-the-air reception.)
Under any realistic assumptions, the revenue potential from the
54
spectrum auction and the social benefits of increased broadband
spectrum dwarfs this cost. Moreover, since less than 100% of the
affected viewers are likely to sign up for the subsidized cable or
satellite subscription, the cost is likely to be somewhat lower.

the government could probably simply send the check to the cable company in bulk each
month to reduce costs and still keep the service viable at these prices.
53. Dianne E. Watson, Keynote Address to Minority Media and
Telecommunications Council Regulatory Breakfast on Minority Media Ownership and
Telecommunications Legislation (July 2005), available at http://www.womenspeech
archive.org/files/c_1164814080880.pdf [hereinafter Watson].
54. See supra, note 28, and infra Section V.B. for a discussion of revenue potential
from auctioning television broadcasting spectrum for mobile broadband use.
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Channel Sharing May Alleviate Reduction in Broadcasting Options

Even if approximately 40% of the broadcast spectrum in those
markets is redeployed, residents will still have over-the-air
broadcasting from the remaining 60% of the broadcasters without
changes. They will hardly be deprived of choice relative to most of
the rest of the country, particularly if they are offered a subsidized
cable subscription plan. However, another option to preserve
broadcasters‘ businesses would be to utilize the industry’s remaining
spectrum differently and potentially more efficiently. With the digital
conversion, television broadcasters no longer require the full 6 Mhz
of spectrum they currently receive with their licenses to broadcast a
standard television show. Standard definition channels now only
require approximately 1 Mhz and even high definition channels can
be broadcast with approximately 3 Mhz of spectrum. This opens the
possibility of channel “sharing” whereby two stations, or more, could
“share” one 6 Mhz channel or repacking each channel to only 3–4
Mhz so as to accommodate more of existing broadcasters on less
spectrum. Such spectrum realignments, while within the FCC’s
current authorization, often require a painful regulatory process the
55
FCC may not be willing to endure.
Regardless of whether the government chooses continued mustcarry with subsidized cable and satellite, channel sharing or smaller
television broadcast spectrum allocations to accommodate more
broadcasters, it has several options to ensure that residents in regions
served by broadcasters who lose spectrum have access to free local
broadcast content. These options would leave considerable savings
after the receipt of $34.9 billion to $41.7 billion of auction proceeds,
minus the compensation, if any, to broadcasters and/or subsidization
56
of basic cable and satellite.

55. The FCC recommends that Congress expand its powers to offer various incentive
auctions to incumbent licensees largely because “[c]ontentious spectrum proceedings can
be time-consuming, sometimes taking many years to resolve, and incurring significant
opportunity costs. One way to address this challenge is by motivating existing licensees to
voluntarily clear spectrum through incentive auctions.” Spectrum, supra note 7, at
Recommendation 5.4.
56. See supra note 28, and Exhibits 5 and 6 in Section V.B. infra for an analysis of
potential auction proceeds.
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D. Government Promises to Respect Broadcasters’ Property Interests in
Their FCC Licenses
57, 58

On multiple occasions in 2010 and 2011,
the government
announced it would transition the television broadcast spectrum on a
voluntary basis. That is, the government would negotiate the terms of
the buyout with the broadcasters, who could opt out of the
settlement. Because the process is “voluntary,” the broadcasters
could theoretically refuse to participate and instead retain control of
their licenses, thus thwarting the government’s desire to reacquire the
spectrum.
Moreover, by proposing such negotiations, the
government is essentially offering to implicitly recognize that the
broadcasters possess property rights in their licenses (or at least that
the government will behave in a manner that mimics such
recognition). This is because the ability to control an asset is a critical
element of property rights. As a result of the government’s de facto
recognition that broadcasters possess property rights in their licenses,
the broadcasters would be entitled to compensation for any
deprivation of those interests. Industry observers have speculated as
to the pricing and terms of the television broadcasters’ buyout. Few
doubt the broadcasters will end up with a package that does less than
make them whole.

IV. Existing Proposals for Removing Television Broadcasters
From the Electromagnetic Spectrum
With the question of recognizing property rights effectively
resolved for purposes of efficiently moving the broadcasters off the
spectrum, the debate shifts to how to determine appropriate
compensation to the broadcasters for voluntarily relinquishing their
59
spectrum rights. Given the estimated enterprise value of the

57. Lawrence Summers, director of the National Economic Council, is quoted as
saying “Our plan [to free-up spectrum for mobile broadband] will allow all stations that
currently broadcast the right to continue to broadcast,” in a speech at the New America
Foundation on June 29, 2010. “It is based on the principle of voluntarism.” Summers
Emphasizes Voluntary Return of Broadcast Spectrum, TELEVISION BROADCAST .COM,
(June 28, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.televisionbroadcast.com/article/102670.
58. Julius Genachowski, chairman of the FCC, is quoted as saying, “but the single
biggest step [to free-up spectrum for mobile broadband] is voluntary incentive auctions.”
Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Jobs and the Broadband Economy, Address at
LivingSocial Event (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/genachow
skis-speech-jobs-and-broadband-economy.
59. “Enterprise Value” is a financial term used to denote the full value of a business.
It is calculated as equity value + debt – cash + other adjustments.
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broadcasting industry is approximately $60 billion to $65 billion, and
the implications any precedent may have on other FCC licensees, the
issue of spectrum reallocation has received considerable attention
from the broadcasting industry, consumer groups and from those
concerned about maximizing the benefits to the U.S. Treasury from a
future re-auction of the spectrum. Unsurprisingly, many proposed
solutions have been advanced—each with their own strengths and
weaknesses.
A. Not Renewing Licenses is an Option

One possible solution for reallocating the television broadcast
spectrum is for the FCC to simply not renew the licenses of the
television broadcasters at the end of their license periods. While this
would be consistent with the letter of the law and the legislative
history, it might be an uphill battle from a historical interpretation
perspective. It would essentially deny the broadcasters any property
rights based on either licenses or easement or adverse possession.
However, based on the government’s experience with cattle grazing
permits, this option may be feasible for the government. Specifically,
holders of grazing permits had considerably greater historical
precedent and some arguably favorable legislative history supporting
61
their arguments for renewal rights than do broadcasters.
Nevertheless, courts have consistently allowed the government to
deny renewal of the permits based on a textual analysis of the
62
Similarly, courts would likely permit
applicable statutes.
government nonrenewal of broadcasters’ licenses based on the same
63
textual analysis of the communications statutes.
Perhaps the strongest argument for this approach is that it would
help to prevent setting a precedent that holders of government
licenses, in any area, from mining, to oil drilling to cattle grazing,
possess property rights associated with those licenses. The U.S.

60. One report estimates the enterprise value of the broadcasting industry to be $63.2
billion. See Coleman Bazelon, The Need for Additional Spectrum for Wireless Broadband:
The Economic Benefit and Costs of Reallocations, WHITE PAPER, at 13 (Oct. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Bazelon I]. An FCC report estimates it to be $63.7 billion. Spectrum, supra
note 7 at n.87. [collectively, hereinafter Broadcast Industry Valuation].
61. Ownership Rights, supra note 19, at 27.
62. See, e.g., Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728 (2000); Fed. Lands Legal
Consortium v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999).
63. The FCC has stated it has this right. The FCC also claims it has the right to
modify licenses in the middle of license periods. FCC Report 10-201, at 76, FCC (Dec. 23,
2010),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1223/FCC-10-201
A1.pdf, [hereinafter FCC Report 10-201].
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government cannot function efficiently if it faces the risk of
unwillingly granting property rights anytime it grants a license to
access government resources. From a political perspective, however,
non-renewal of licenses would be considered “unfair” and give the
broadcasters significant ability to mobilize their already powerful
political support. Even if successful, this approach would likely also
take considerable time due to the numerous legal challenges and
64
appeals from the broadcasters. Moreover, it may well put many
broadcasters out of business, depriving their viewers of the benefits of
their television content. Another problem with the nonrenewal
approach is that it would likely cause current and potential FCC
spectrum license holders to question the certainty of their license
rights. This would disincentivize them to bid the highest rates at FCC
auctions and invest in the aggressive build out of the very advanced
broadband services the FCC seeks to encourage.
B. Upgrade the Television Broadcasting Licenses Free of Cost

The opposite extreme to not renewing broadcasting licenses is to
“upgrade” the broadcasters’ rights. Currently, the broadcasters’
licenses only allow them to use their spectrum for television
broadcasting and some limited ancillary uses. An upgrade would
allow the broadcasters to migrate their use of frequency from
television broadcasting to mobile data. This is somewhat similar to
65
Evan Kwerel and John Williams’ proposal, which advocates having
the broadcasters auction their spectrum to parties, including
themselves, who would use it for the highest value alongside a
government auction for unassigned broadcasting spectrum. This
approach would be the most politically expedient solution with
respect to the broadcasting community and the FCC could effect it
without the need for congressional action. This proposal would likely
eliminate any resistance from the broadcasters because they would
receive a free option to use their licenses for more lucrative mobile
broadband. The government could potentially implement the free
“upgrade” approach quickly and unleash the significant societal
benefits from the increased broadband access. This approach would

64. Ownership Rights, supra note 19, at 45.
65. Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market
Allocation of Spectrum, in 38 OPP WORKING PAPER SERIES (November 2002) [hereinafter
Kwerel & Williams].
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also place spectrum in private hands, an approach many economists
66
favor.
However, giving the mobile broadband usage rights to the
broadcasters would also likely generate massive resistance from other
holders of mobile broadband spectrum, notably the wireless carriers
67
who, since the 1990s, have paid enormous amounts for their
spectrum. These carriers would object that the dramatic increase in
supply of spectrum would decrease the value of their spectrum. In
addition, those who paid handsomely for their spectrum rights for
mobile broadband use would legitimately complain that the free grant
of mobile broadband rights to broadcasters would give the
broadcasters an unfair competitive advantage. Unlike the incumbent
mobile broadband providers, the broadcasters would have no debt
service or return-on-investment hurdles related to acquiring the
68
spectrum.
These concerns could be alleviated, however, through an auction
process whereby broadband rights would be auctioned and the
existing holders, the broadcasters in this case, would keep the
proceeds. Existing mobile broadband providers, for whom the value
of spectrum is highest, would likely purchase the majority of the
69
spectrum. Furthermore, because all acquirers in an auction would
have to pay for their spectrum, there would be little change in
competitive position with respect to debt levels, return on investment
hurdles or other financial/strategic issues.
The most problematic aspect of Kwerel and Williams’ “giveaway” approach is that it would deprive the federal government of
any revenue from the new use of the broadcasters’ spectrum. The
value would go to the broadcasters who did not even pay the
government for the rights to use the spectrum for television
66. This line of economic thinking started most prominently with Ronald Coase’s
seminal article. See Coase, supra note 18.
67. In the 1980s, the early stages of the wireless industry, wireless operators received
FCC spectrum licenses without payment based on a comparative hearing process.
68. When the FCC authorized the Alternative Terrestrial Component (“ATC”)
which enabled the satellite telephone carriers to use their spectrum terrestrial, there was
enormous negative feedback from the wireless carriers. Lynetta Luna, Satellites and
Spectrum, URGENT COMMC’NS (March 1, 2003), http://urgentcomm.com/mag/radio_
satellites_spectrum. Allowing television broadcasters free “upgrade” of their spectrum to
use it for mobile broadband would be exponentially larger, and presumably cause an even
greater outcry.
69. Given the enormous start-up costs and economies of scale for a mobile
communications service, it would be unlikely for a new service to emerge if it has to pay
market price for all of its assets. Therefore, the successful bidders for spectrum are likely
to be existing telecom service providers.
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broadcasting, much less for the more economically valuable use of
mobile broadband services. To simply give this excess value to the
broadcasting industry would be an enormous act of government waste
and deprive U.S. taxpayers of a significant source of revenue.
However, if the FCC is not able to strike a deal with the broadcasters,
they may be forced into this solution. After a certain amount of
delay, the large economic benefits to society of broadband
deployment could outweigh the waste involved in giving away large
amounts of spectrum value. As mentioned previously, if Congress
does not act, the FCC may have little choice.
C. “Incentive Auctions” and Other Upside Sharing Between Broadcasters
and the Government

Several legislative proposals suggest the government should
“share” the upside of the higher value use of the spectrum with the
70
broadcasters via “incentive auctions” or other suggest methods such
71
The primary problem with these “sharing”
as “overlay rights.”
solutions is that they are not based on clear, defensible legal
principles. Almost any level of sharing of the “upside” for the move
from television broadcasting to mobile broadband is destined to seem
arbitrary and turn into an entirely political negotiation. This could
also set a problematic precedent, as it might suggest to licensees of
other spectrum the FCC might want to repurpose that the FCC is
required to share the increased value from that repurposing with
them as well. Additionally, the introduction of a new paradigm for
spectrum allocation is likely to take a long time to clear political
hurdles and be accepted by the many constituencies involved. As
previously noted, time is critical in moving television broadcast
spectrum to make additional room for mobile broadband use.
Finally, voluntary sharing models will not ensure the availability of
uniform amount of spectrum nationwide needed for efficient mobile
broadband deployment. Some involuntary methods will likely still be
needed to clear holdout broadcasters in certain markets.

70. These include provisions in House Resolution 2482 and expected provisions in
the recommendation of the United States Congress Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction—also known as the “super committee.” See American Jobs Act of 2011, H.R.
2482, 111th Cong., Doc. No. 112-53 (2011); Sam Churchill, NTIA “Finds” 1.5 GHz of
Federal Spectrum, DAILYWIRELESS.ORG (Oct. 19, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://www.daily
wireless.org/2011/10/19/ntia-finds-1-5-ghz-of-federal-spectrum/.
71. Professor Hazlett proposes an auction of rights for mobile broadband rights using
the current television broadcast spectrum whereby the auction winner would need to
negotiate approval for use with the television broadcaster occupying that spectrum.
Hazlett, supra note 6, at 9–18.
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In a twist on the sharing model, a recent proposal by the
72
broadcasting industry suggests the government upgrade their
spectrum licenses to allow the broadcasters to work with broadband
providers to “overlay” their broadband services on traditional
television broadcasting, presumably on the portions of their 6 Mhz
allocations they are not using. The broadband providers would pay a
fee to the television broadcasters. In return, the television
broadcasters would share a portion of this fee with the federal
government. Conceptually, this concept is even more egregious than
the incentive auction proposal from a public policy perspective. With
the incentive auction proposal, the broadcasters, who have minimal
legal rights to the spectrum are being offered an opportunity to give
up their spectrum in return for a share of the upside when it is sold.
In the case of the “overlay” proposal, the broadcasters are asking for
greater rights to their spectrum with an offer to “share” some of it
with the federal government. Presumably, they are advocating
retaining control of the spectrum to achieve greater economics than
simply sharing in the auction proceeds, thus increasing the level of
waste for U.S. taxpayers.
A significant redeeming feature of sharing proposals, however, is
that they offer the broadcasters significant upside while avoiding a
direct government payout, which would more directly expose the
government to charges of waste. Of course, under any sharing plan,
the U.S. government would ultimately indirectly pay for the expected
cost of any payments to the broadcasters as the revenue from the sale
of the broadcasting rights would be less than a direct sale of the
spectrum by the expected amount of the cost to “clear” the
broadcasters from the spectrum. Accordingly, despite its potential
political merits, sharing proposals are neither optimal for the U.S.
Treasury nor will they quickly and uniformly clear spectrum for next
generation mobile broadband providers.
D. Licensing “White Spaces” Between the Television Broadcasters

Since only about 17% of the broadcast channel allocation is used,
another possible way to accommodate mobile broadband applications
without disturbing current television broadcasters is for the FCC to
license the unused “white space” between the frequencies used by
broadcasters. This idea has at least four major problems. The first
72. Rick Smith, Broadcast Coalition Offers Alternative to FCC Spectrum Auction,
WRALTECHWIRE (Oct. 20, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://wraltechwire.com/business/tech_wire/
opinion/blogpost/10281218/.
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problem is the white space tends to differ in each television
Designated Market Area (“DMA”). As a result, consumer devices
would likely need complex technology to detect which frequencies
could be used in certain areas without interfering with the television
broadcasters. This in turn would drive up the cost and complexity of
rolling out incremental mobile broadband services. As a second
problem, white space tends to be most abundant in rural areas where
demand for incremental spectrum is lowest, while white space is less
available in metropolitan areas where demand is the highest. For
example, in the Los Angeles/San Diego area, there is, even with no
adjacent channel protection, only 60 MHz of white space, whereas in
73
Wichita there is 216 Mhz. While 60 MHz is a significant amount of
spectrum, it is one fifth of the 300 Mhz the FCC is seeking in the first
stage of the National Broadband Plan. Moreover, when FCC Radius
channel protection is added, there is only 6 Mhz of white space in the
Los Angeles/San Diego area and none in New York, but 102 Mhz in
74
Wichita. The third problem is that licensing white space would lock
new users into fragmented spaces of spectrum that are frequently not
individually large enough to be optimal for mobile broadband.
Moreover, the broadcasters’ business model has been under
75
pressure and many will likely go out of business over the next
76
several years. Therefore, it does not make sense for the FCC to
encourage new mobile broadband services to build their business
models around suboptimal pieces of spectrum that will be eventually
clearing, albeit slowly, on their own. It makes more sense for the
government to have an organized national spectrum clearing
77
process.
Finally, the fragmented nature of the spectrum and its
73. COLEMAN BAZELON, CHARLES L. JACKSON & DOROTHY ROBYN, COMMENTS
OF CHARLES L. JACKSON, DOROTHY ROBYN AND COLEMAN BAZELON (THE VALUE OF
WHITE SPACE) Figure B-2 (2008), available at http://www.brattle.com/_documents/
uploadlibrary/upload691.pdf. [Hereinafter Service Rules].
74. Id. at Figure B-4.
75. See discussion infra Part V. A. for a further discussion of television broadcasters’
business model.
76. The television broadcasters will likely experience some increase in advertising
revenue over the next year due to increased political advertising in the 2012 election cycle
and the emergence of the U.S. economy from recession. However, the long-term industry
outlook is negative.
77. Some of the third objection could be solved by “repacking” the remaining
broadcaster’s spectrum. Repacking would involve an FCC administrative process
whereby remaining broadcasters’ frequency is reorganized into contiguous blocks,
potentially allowing for large continuous nationwide blocks for mobile broadband. The
transition to digital broadcasting facilitates this process since broadcasters could
potentially keep their station number on viewers’ digital receivers even though the
broadcast frequency has changed. Broadcasters would, however, need to make changes to
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inverse availability in areas relative to where it is needed most would
lower its value in any auctions. One study put a maximum value of
such an auction at $24.4 billion, with a projection for half that amount
if there is adjacent channel protection to reduce interference between
78
licensees. This is significantly lower than levels indicated in the
analysis in Exhibit 5. While the FCC has decided to allocate some
79
white-space spectrum to unlicensed mobile broadband usage, this
can only be a small part of the solution. Meeting the FCC’s goal of
reallocating 120 Mhz of spectrum nationwide will require that some
broadcasting licenses, particularly in metropolitan areas, be revoked,
or not renewed, with or without compensation.
Some telecommunication industry observers have suggested
80
unlicensed applications for white space. This is preferable to the
long-term commitments that would implicitly be made by licensing
this spectrum, but it does not give businesses the confidence they
would need to invest heavily in development of new mobile
broadband services. It also does not solve the interference concerns
81
and would not provide any money to the U.S. Treasury.
E. Grandfathering Current Broadcasters to Slowly “Phase-in” Spectrum
Changeover

Another option is to “grandfather” existing broadcasters while
preventing new entrants in the broadcast spectrum. In many
environmental regulatory situations, regulators often “grandfather”
existing participants, rather than buying them out. This allows them
to continue indefinitely, while not allowing new entrants, in order to
change an accepted practice over a period of time.
In the
broadcasters’ situation, this would mean letting existing broadcasters
continue, but not issuing new broadcast licenses. This has the obvious
advantage of avoiding a costly government buyout as the new regime
is implemented and the “grandfathered” participants cease.
However, this would be a very slow process as many broadcasters
their transmission equipment. One estimate of this cost is $0.78 billion. Bazelon II, supra
note 51, at 22.
78. Comments of Jackson, et al., supra note 73, at 7.
79. Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, ET Docket No. 04-186 (Sep. 23, 2010),
available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db0923/FCC-10174A1.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
80. Sascha D. Meinrath & Michael Calabrese, Unlicensed “White Space Device”
Operations on the TV Band and the Myth of Harmful Interference, NEW AMERICA
FOUND., (Mar. 2008).
81. Anecdotal information from industry sources indicates the U.S. Treasury is
closely watching this process with an eye towards maximizing revenue for the government.
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have been in business for decades and are not likely to voluntarily
leave the industry soon. “Grandfathering” tends to work better in
other contexts, such as pollution, where the plants (or machinery)
causing the pollution naturally need to be replaced over time due to
wear and tear. Moreover, for broadcasters to find grandfathering
palatable, they would want to be able to transfer their grandfathered
permits. If this were allowed, any meaningful reduction of television
broadcast frequency usage would take decades. Grandfathering is an
option that is more appropriate when trying to prevent an unwanted
externality, such as pollution, from increasing, as opposed to rapidly
decreasing it as is the need with television broadcasting over the
electromagnetic spectrum.

V. Traditional Property Rights Principles Provide a
Mechanism for Compensating Broadcasters
Given the government’s effective recognition of elements of
property rights in broadcasters’ spectrum licenses, the established
traditional property principles of zoning and eminent domain—two
methods by which government can reclaim its rights to private
property—may provide the most simple, the most politically
expedient and the most principled framework for guiding a solution
to compensate broadcasters. The balance of this paper will explore
these two options.
A. Zoning Alone is of Limited Use in Framing a Solution

Zoning concepts may be useful in the context of spectrum
reallocation, but are ultimately problematic as a complete solution.
Through zoning ordinances, governments frequently alter property
rights to achieve a desired social outcome. Zoning ordinances often
significantly alter the value of property or even prohibit the owner
from engaging in their current business. Currently, the broadcast
television spectrum is “zoned” exclusively for that use. As a city
planner might rezone a section of town from commercial to
residential, the FCC could theoretically “rezone” the spectrum from
use for television broadcast use to mobile broadband use. While this
“rezoning” would ultimately increase the value of the spectrum to
society (by allowing for mobile broadband use), it would likely
eliminate the value of the current holders of broadcasting licenses,
defeating the government’s desire for an equitable solution. In
addition, “rezoning” entails uncertainties that limit its desirability as a
solution to the challenge of spectrum reallocation.
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Uncertainty with Zoning Approach

An attempt by the FCC to rationalize spectrum use by changing
the “zoning” of the television broadband spectrum to exclusive
mobile broadband use would be risky because the impact on existing
broadcasters is uncertain. If commercial land, for example, is rezoned
residential, the owner can still build a residential home on the
property. In the spectrum context, however, it is not certain whether
a rezoning would similarly give the existing television broadcasters
the right to use the spectrum for the “rezoned” (and much more
valuable) mobile broadband use.
Alternatively, such rezoning may eliminate their rights to the
spectrum completely. The first scenario (whereby the broadcasters
would automatically have rights to the rezoned spectrum) is unlikely
because it requires a determination that broadcasters have complete
property rights for all authorized uses of their spectrum, insofar as
they could use the spectrum for the new more valuable mobile
broadband applications. Such a finding would be against any plain
reading of the text of their licenses that limits their use to television
broadcasting. The latter scenario (whereby the rezoning would cause
the broadcasters to lose all rights) is far more likely because the
weight of the evidence, particularly the usage rules surrounding
broadcast licenses, suggests that the television broadcasters only have
rights for television broadcasting. Thus, if the broadcasters’ spectrum
were rezoned for different use, the broadcasters would likely lose all
rights to the spectrum. But depending on how the television
broadcasters’ rights are viewed, they may be entitled to compensation
for their current use. In a traditional property context, this situation
is tantamount to a property where one party, a farmer, for example,
sells the commercial building rights to a property while keeping the
farming rights. In the event the property was rezoned entirely
residential, the farmer could lose his or her interest completely as
only one element of the property’s use is being affected. If a court
took a narrow view of the farmer’s property rights, that all of his
farming rights were lost, however, he or she could be due
compensation. Although the risk is low, the government may not
want to expose itself to the possible risks (however small) of being
forced to recognize full property rights to television broadcasters to
use their licensed spectrum for mobile broadband. On the other
hand, the government would also want to avoid being forced to pay
uncertain compensation or risk an inequitable solution for
broadcasters.
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An intermediate zoning option would be for the FCC to reduce
the spectrum allocated to the broadcasters from the current 6 Mhz
per channel. This would be somewhat akin to a zoning ordinance that
requires property owners to allocate some of their property for public
use. While reducing the spectrum allocation of each broadcaster may
be part of an overall strategy to free spectrum for mobile broadband
applications, it is unlikely to open up a sufficient quantity of spectrum
for the government to meet its overall goal of reclaiming 120 Mhz of
television broadcast spectrum. To meet its nationwide spectrum
goals, the government will likely have to completely eliminate some
currently existing broadcast licenses.
2.

Timing Considerations for Zoning Changes

If the government were to pursue rezoning as a viable option to
reallocate the spectrum, it would need to determine the optimal
timing of such action. Traditional property law dictates that if a
property interest (which presumably includes the broadcasters’
expectation of use for the duration of their license periods as well as
any other potential property interest in the spectrum) is eliminated in
order to confer a benefit to society, the owner is entitled to fair value
82
compensation based on the prior use. In Pennsylvania Coal, the
Supreme Court ruled that regulation which effectively eliminated the
mining rights to land was a regulatory taking requiring compensation.
Thus, a rezoning that annulled the broadcasters’ spectrum rights
during their license terms would also be considered a regulatory
taking and would likely require market compensation based on the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, despite the lack of clear
property rights in the spectrum license. The broadcasters’ licenses
provide them with a clear expectation of use of the spectrum for the
duration of the license period. A zoning change during the license
period by the party who granted the license would clearly frustrate
those expectations. However, the broadcasters would not be entitled
to any compensation if the FCC could successfully demonstrate that
the rezoning was being done to prevent harm to society or eliminate a
83
public nuisance. Specifically, the FCC would have to demonstrate
that the current usage of the spectrum harms society as it limits the
availability of more valuable mobile data applications. However, this
argument would likely fail because zoning to prevent harm is typically
used for health and safety issues. Limited access to mobile

82. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
83. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
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broadband applications is unlikely to rise to this level. Thus, if the
government “rezoned” broadcasting spectrum to prohibit
broadcasting in favor of more valuable mobile broadband use during
the license term, the government would likely owe the broadcasters
84
The compensation would be based on the fair
compensation.
market value for the balance of their license terms and any other
property rights in the spectrum they may have.
For practical purposes, the government’s desire to avoid
protracted litigation makes a unilateral termination of broadcasters’
licenses prior to the expiration of their eight-year terms unlikely. At
the end of the license term, the government could likely rezone the
spectrum without compensation because the broadcasters have
relatively weak legal claims to continued property rights in the
85
spectrum.
However, there is no guarantee that the government, even if it
wanted to, could entirely avoid compensating the broadcasters
through rezoning at the expiration of the license periods. In the
unlikely event the courts deemed the broadcasters to have property
interests in the spectrum for broadcasting, the government would owe
them compensation for the decline in enterprise value of their
organizations due to the spectrum loss. This amount is likely far
more substantial than losses stemming from not being able to use the
spectrum for the balance of the license period that would result from
rezoning the spectrum before expiration. Also, in the extremely
unlikely (but possible) scenario that the broadcasters are ultimately
found to have complete property rights to use spectrum for mobile
broadband, they could be entitled to the full value of the spectrum at
its new enhanced value for mobile broadband use. Finally, if
broadcasters are found to have no property rights, they will still likely
86
enjoy significant due process rights.
As such, rezoning to reacquire the spectrum is not without legal
and strategic risks to both the government and the broadcasters, and
also poses significant due process challenges. Absent political
considerations and based solely on legal property principles, the most
likely rezoning scenario would result in the broadcasters getting no
compensation assuming the government waits until the end of the
84. FCC Report 10-201, supra note 63, at 74–75. The FCC disputes this conclusion
and argues that it has the right to modify spectrum licenses in the middle of the license
period for the public benefit, even in the case of licenses for which the licensee has paid
for the right to use the spectrum under specific terms.
85. Ownership Rights, supra note 19, at Section II.
86. Id. at Section VI.
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license period. Therefore, while neither the government nor the
broadcasters will likely pursue rezoning as the principal method for
reacquiring the spectrum, the FCC may use the threat of “down
zoning” or “rezoning” as a “stick” to encourage the broadcasters to
negotiate a more optimal settlement in good faith. Of course, once
spectrum is reclaimed the government would effectively rezone it
from broadcasting to mobile broadband use. However, rezoning
would not be a good primary tool for the government to reclaim the
broadcasters’ spectrum in the first place.
B. Eminent Domain Provides a More Promising Framework for
Determining Compensation

Eminent domain, however, may be a useful traditional property
framework for fashioning an equitable solution between the FCC and
the broadcasters. Eminent domain allows the government to take
87
private property for “public use” while compensating the owner.
Traditionally, eminent domain is used for building schools, roads, and
other public works that require large plots of land where the
government cannot afford to be “held-up” by a resisting landowner
who could thwart the project.
88
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court made clear
that eminent domain can be invoked to transfer property from one
private party to another in order to further economic development.
Moreover, the earlier Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
89
Detroit, decision offers the government some deference in making
the decision. It does not hold the government liable if the anticipated
economic benefits do not occur as long as they are reasonably
expected and were the major reason for the decision.
In the case of broadcast spectrum, the government would
similarly reallocate the spectrum from one private party (the current
broadcasters) to other private parties (mobile wireless broadband
providers) in order to enhance the value of the spectrum to society.
Hence, Kelo would support the use of eminent domain to acquire the
underutilized television broadcast spectrum and later reallocate it for
reuse by mobile broadband providers. Many analyses of the
telecommunication spectrum suggest that the current use of 294 Mhz
by the broadcasters is inefficient for society and could be much better
87. Eminent Domain, CORNELL UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eminent_domain (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:15 PM) (defining
eminent domain).
88. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
89. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
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90

used by mobile data providers. Poletown provides the government
the authority to use its discretion even in the unlikely event that the
expected benefits of increased mobile broadband spectrum do not
come to fruition.
C. Political Power Considerations Will Not End

While the goal of the traditional property rights/eminent domain
strategy is to minimize the political aspect of the process through an
appeal to established law, the process will undoubtedly remain highly
political. Unfortunately, political will is a required part of any
framework the government might employ. For example, an eminent
domain action cannot commence without the government initially
bringing a case. In fact, it would be very naïve to expect the
government to adopt a straightforward eminent domain approach.
This is because broadcasters would likely exert significant political
pressure on government officials to avoid such an approach because it
would deny broadcasters the premium buyout they seek.
1.

Payments to Broadcasters Likely to Be Larger Than Necessary

Ultimately, these political pressures will likely result in the
broadcasters getting a somewhat larger recovery than an eminent
domain-type settlement because the government will need to induce
them to support the process. An “even trade” will probably not be
enough to get the broadcasters’ cooperation. This is particularly
likely to be the case in urban areas where broadcasters are, on the
whole, more profitable, and where the government needs the
spectrum the most. Broadcasters are highly organized and possess a
great deal of political power, their stakes are high, and their interests
91
are almost uniformly aligned.
2.

Eminent Domain Can Set the Framework for Broadcaster Compensation

The existence of eminent domain as a potential solution can play
a significant role in resolving the negotiation as to the level of
90. A partial list of these include: Richard H. Thaler, Buried Treasure in Your TV
Dial, NEW YORK TIMES (February 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/
business/economy/28view.html; Kim McAvoy, FCC Begins TV Spectrum Swap,
TVNEWSCHECK, (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/2010/11/30/4736
7/fcc-begins-tv-spectrum-revamp/page/1; OBI Technical Paper, No. 3, supra note 10 at 7;
Bruce M. Owen, Saving Mt. Wilson—and Increasing Spectrum Efficiency, PERSPECTIVES
FROM FSF SCHOLARS, Vol. 4, No. 18 (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.freestatefoundation.
org/images/Saving_Mt._Wilson_-_and_Increasing_ Spectrum_Efficiency.pdf.
91. Merrill, supra note 17, at 281 (discussing the elements that influence a group’s
power under a distributional theory).
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compensation, if any, the government will owe the broadcasters to
clear the spectrum for mobile broadband use. A discussion of the
government’s established right to acquire the spectrum via eminent
domain at a small fraction of its higher mobile broadband use value
would be a good starting point for the negotiations. Any increased
prominence of the eminent domain option could significantly reframe
the discussions to the advantage of the U.S. Treasury. On the other
hand, discussions centered around the absolute value of the spectrum
and the broadcasters’ alleged “ownership” of the spectrum (as
opposed to an interest in their license for broadcasting use and the
value of the must carry rules) would likely suggest a payout to
broadcasters above the market value for television broadcasting use.
One of the major factors mitigating broadcaster resistance under an
eminent domain approach is likely to be that they would not be
economically harmed. Broadcasters would keep the majority of the
value of their businesses and get a market-based buyout for the
remainder. The fact that they would not be harmed combined with
the threat of downzoning if they are unable to reach an agreement
could significantly limit the cohesion of the group’s resistance as
offers from the government begin to marginally exceed the value of
the business they stand to lose from turning over their broadcast
licenses. Moreover, the simplicity of this option and the fact this
method is generally accepted in U.S. law may also help to accelerate
the pace of discussions as they could be framed around a concrete,
well-established legal model as opposed to attempting to get
consensus for a new alternative legal framework.

VI. Valuation Advantages of
Traditional Property Law Approach
A critical principle of compensation for eminent domain and
rezoning actions is that any compensation payment is based on the
fair market value of the property at the time of the taking, based on
its use, at that time. This principle was established by United States v.
92
Cors, where the Court ruled that compensation to the owner of a
tugboat that was requisitioned by the government during World War
II could not include the appreciation of the value in the tugboat
created by the government’s increased wartime demand. In Cors, the
Court said: “[t]hat is a value which the government itself created and
93
hence in fairness should not be required to pay.” Assuming the
92. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
93. Cors, 337 U.S. at 334.
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government concedes property rights to broadcasters, any FCC
broadcasting licenses that are not renewed would be analogous to
condemned property in a traditional eminent domain action. As with
the tugboat owner in Cors, the television broadcasting license owners
would not be entitled to any surplus that might come from any new,
and potentially more lucrative, use by the government such as mobile
broadband applications. Valuation would instead be based on the
current use for broadcasting.
A. Broadcast Spectrum Valuations are Affordable

As mentioned previously, the television broadcast industry is, as a
whole, likely worth between $60 billion and $65 billion based on
94
recent estimates. Although the government seeks to reacquire
approximately 40.8% of the broadcasters’ spectrum (120Mhz of their
294 Mhz), economist Coleman Bazelon estimates the cost to the
government of outright acquiring the broadcasters needed to clear
120 Mhz of spectrum nationwide at $15.2 billion at auction or
95
approximately only 24% of the industry’s enterprise value. This is
because much of the spectrum allocated for television broadcasting is
not licensed and remains unused in many markets and thus would not
96
Moreover, due to
need to be reacquired from licensees.
97
inefficiencies in Bazelon’s reverse auction proposal, including paying
each bought-out broadcaster at the highest bid that is not accepted,
and a relatively small pool of sellers in each market that can lead to
various forms of market manipulation, an eminent domain strategy is
likely to be achievable at somewhat lower valuations than Bazelon’s
estimates. A sensitivity analysis of such a buyout is shown in Exhibit
2 below.
However, since, approximately 10% of broadcasters’ viewership is
over-the-air, perhaps over 90% of television broadcasters’ value lies
not in their over-the-air transmission rights, but in their
retransmission on cable and satellite systems. Compensating them for
their full enterprise value when, on average only 10% of it is
attributable to their broadcasting activity, would result in significant
overcompensation.

94. Broadcast Industry Valuation, supra note 60.
95. Bazelon II, supra note 51.
96. Hazlett, supra note 12, at 5–6.
97. Bazelon II, supra note 51, at 19. In the reverse auction, broadcasters would
submit bids for the price at which they would sell their licenses and be paid the highest bid
that was not accepted. This method is designed to encourage truthfulness in the bidding
process, but is likely to increase payout prices to broadcasters above fair market value.
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Maintaining Must-Carry Could Significantly Lower Reacquisition Costs

As mentioned above, most of the broadcasters’ viewership comes
from retransmission on satellite and cable systems. Thus, if the
government could modify the must-carry rules to give them continued
retransmission rights after they return their spectrum, broadcaster
compensation for the loss of their licenses would be limited to the
value of the over-the-air viewers. Using the 10% figure for over-the98
air viewership and a U.S. population estimate of 285 million, the
proper payment to the broadcasters whose spectrum has been
reacquired would be between $2.0 billion and $2.5 billion, including
$1.0 billion for the cost of “repacking” the remaining spectrum
holders close together so as to create the contiguous blocks of
nationwide spectrum mobile broadband providers find most efficient.
In addition to preserving the value of the broadcasters’ assets, and
thus lowering the needed buy-out price, this approach also preserves
the value the broadcasters bring to their communities with their
content to the 90% of their viewers who view television over cable or
satellite systems. See Exhibit 3 below for a sensitivity analysis of the
cost:

98. Published spectrum price per Mhz/POP calculations are generally based on 285
million people in the United States even though widely accepted estimates indicate over
309 million people in the United States. I cannot explain this discrepancy, but use the 285
million figure in this paper to ensure consistency with most published price/Mhz POP
calculations.

180

2.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:2

Over-the-Air Transmission and Must-Carry Rights Becoming Less
Important to Broadcasters

Not only are 90% of television viewers served via rebroadcast
over cable and satellite not dependent on wireless spectrum, but also
the broadcasters incur only nominal costs to reach them.
Additionally, the “must-carry” and SHVA rules are slowly becoming
less relevant to the broadcasting industry as a whole. Many
broadcasters have elected to waive such rights so as to be able to
negotiate carriage on a fee basis with cable and satellite operators.
The FCC estimates that only 37% of broadcasters currently rely on
99
must-carry rights to gain carriage. The others waive these rights and
sell their content to the cable and satellite companies for a fee. Thus,
the broadcasters either pay nearly nothing or actually receive
payment for broadcasting to approximately 90% of their audience.
The broadcasters’ cost of serving the 10% of viewers who receive
local broadcast television over-the-air is therefore disproportionately
high as it requires a significant investment in broadcasting
infrastructure as well as ongoing maintenance and electricity costs. In
fact, given the small percentage of people who actually view over-theair television, and the cost associated with providing it, many
broadcasters could actually end up being more profitable by
abandoning over-the-air broadcasting. Additionally, over-the-air

99. Spectrum, supra note 7, at 8.
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100

viewers tend to have lower incomes, are more likely to be over age
101
102
65, and to live in rural areas where cable systems are less
prevalent. These demographic characteristics make the broadcasters’
over-the-air viewers less attractive to advertisers than their viewers on
cable or satellite systems. Therefore, due to the high costs of serving
over-the-air viewers and their unfavorable demographics for
advertisers, the value of these 10% of viewers is likely to be much less
than 10% of the industry’s overall value. These trends support the
use of conservative valuation metrics to compensate broadcasters for
over-the-air subscribers’ losses and any loss or weakening of mustcarry rights.
3.

Over-the-Air Audience Remains Reasonable Proxy for Spectrum
Valuation

The networks, however, would likely argue that, because their
economic model depends on advertising (as opposed to subscription)
revenue, they will no longer be able to compete for any content
against the cable companies if they lose their over-the-air customer
base, even though that represents only about 10% of their total
audience. They will argue that content companies will sell directly to
the cable and satellite companies if the networks cannot deliver the
incremental estimated 10% of the population that cable and satellite
do not reach. This is a valid concern for the broadcasters, but the
number of over-the-air television viewers has been steadily declining
each year. This continuing decline is likely to be inevitable regardless
103
Moreover, television
of what happens to the spectrum.
broadcasters have significant advantages even without spectrum.
There is far more content produced than cable and satellite systems
make available on their networks, particularly niche programming
that typically has difficulty getting carriage. Even without the
advantage of a monopoly on the 9% to 14% of the population who
watch television over-the-air, many content providers would likely be

100. Mark. L. Goldstein, Director, DIGITAL BROADCAST TELEVISION TRANSITION:
ESTIMATED COST OF SUPPORTING SET-TOP BOXES TO HELP ADVANCE THE DTV
TRANSITION, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 4 (2005).
101. TRANSITION IN TROUBLE: ACTION NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL
DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 12
(2008) [hereinafter Civil Rights].
102. Watson, supra note 53.
103. Since 2005, broadcast TV station revenues have declined by 26%, and overall
industry employment has declined as well. Spectrum, supra note 7, at 14 (citing Press
Release, BIA/Kelsey Expects TV Station Revenues to End Year Lower Than Anticipated;
Levels Last Seen in 1990s Predicted Through 2013 (Dec. 22, 2009)).
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eager to sell to broadcasters to ensure they are carried, via
retransmission, on certain cable and satellite systems. Additionally,
many of the local broadcasters add value by producing their own local
content (particularly local news) over which they often effectively
(but not legally) have a monopoly and which advertisers, viewers and
cable systems find desirable.
The advantages to broadcasters of eliminating the expense of
broadcasting is likely to somewhat offset the possible disadvantages
of losing a monopoly serving the over-the-air viewers. Hence, the
percentage of viewing audience that receives the broadcasts over-theair is likely to be a reasonable proxy for the value of the broadcasting
licenses. FCC economists, however, could adjust this estimate as
104
considerations of economic equity might dictate.
B. Higher Value for Mobile Broadband Usage Benefits U.S. Treasury

Mobile broadband spectrum is much more valuable than
105
broadcasting spectrum. It has sold for as much as $1.36 Mhz/pop.
106
On the surface, this differential could provide $46.5 billion in gross
revenue to the federal government if it were to re-auction 120 Mhz of
the television broadcasters’ 294 Mhz of spectrum for mobile
broadband use. This sum dwarfs the roughly $3.4 billion to $6.4
billion the government would need to provide affected over-the-air
viewers with subsidized cable or satellite television service and also to
compensate the broadcasters for the loss of value when invoking
eminent domain on the broadcasters and to repack the remaining
broadcasters and also to subsidize cable and satellite subscriptions for
affected viewers (see Exhibit 1 in Section II.C.3 and Exhibit 3 in
Section V.A.1).
However the economic reality is that some elasticity of demand
will occur as additional spectrum is auctioned, particularly large

104. Attempting to define the precise value of a broadcaster’s spectrum licenses in
relation to its overall enterprise value is beyond the scope of the paper—that project is
best left to FCC economists—however, the percentage of overall viewers is likely to be a
rough working proxy. Spectrum, supra note 7, at n.87.
105. Average price per Mhz/POP from the FCC’s March 2008 700 Mhz license in
which $19.12 billion was bid for 52 Mhz (excluding the D block as the bid did not meet the
minimum reserve bid) covering 285 million people or $1.29 per Mhz/POP. If one also
excludes the E band which sold at $0.74 per Mhz/POP, arguably discounted as it was
auctioned as less desirable “unpaired” spectrum, the price would have been $1.36 per
Mhz/Pop. Auction 73: 700 MHz Band, FCC, available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=73, (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
106. The calculation is: $1.36 Mhz/POP * 285 million people in US * 120 Mhz
auctioned = $46.512 billion.
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107

amounts such as 120 Mhz. Each incremental slice of spectrum will
sell for less than the amount received for the prior amount of
spectrum. The market is also quite fluid and much will depend on the
financial conditions of the likely bidders at the time of the auctions,
their access to capital, and the exact state of the projections for
broadband growth. On one hand, the recent success of the iPhone 4,
the iPad 2 the Android-based smart phones, and the general growth
in mobile broadband applications, would indicate greater demand for
wireless broadband and a higher price. On the other hand, the recent
economic downturn could reduce demand and push bidding lower. In
this context, an initial price projection of $1.20 to $1.40 per Mhz/POP
with an elasticity of demand of between -1.1 to -1.3 seems reasonable
108
and in line with other estimates. The elasticity indicates that a 1.1%
to 1.3% increase in quantity will result in a 1.0% decrease in price for
spectrum. This implies than an auction of 120 Mhz would yield an
average price of $1.02 and $1.22 Mhz/POP raising $34.9 billion to 41.7
billion. (See Exhibit 4 of a sensitivity analysis of potential revenue per
Mhz/POP raised under different initial price and elasticity of demand
assumptions and see Exhibit 5 for an analysis of amounts that could
be raised by an auction of various sizes and price per Mhz/POP
assumptions). Under any reasonable assumption, however, an
eminent domain solution would provide significant additional funds
well beyond the $3.4 to $6.4 billion needed to compensate
broadcasters and viewers.

107. Although the National Broadband Plan recommends an auction of only 120 Mhz
of television spectrum to reach its initial target of increasing broadband spectrum 300 Mhz
in five years the FCC has not yet determined the size and timing of the auction
process(es).
108. Bazelon I, supra note 60, at 5. Economist Coleman Bazelon suggests a base value
of $1.00 and an elasticity of demand of -1.2. Given the recent success of the wireless
broadband products and services and the partial stock market recovery since his October
2009 article, a base value of $1.30 seems reasonable. However, economic conditions could
vary widely between now and any future auction date.
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Initial Price Per Mhz/POP

Exhibit 4.
Net Price per Mhz/POP vs. Elasticty of Demand & Initial Price Assumptions
Elasticity of Demand - 120 Mhz Auction Size
$1.02
-1.0
-1.1
-1.2
-1.3
-1.4
$1.60
$1.34
$1.36
$1.38
$1.39
$1.41
$1.55
$1.30
$1.32
$1.34
$1.35
$1.36
$1.50
$1.25
$1.27
$1.29
$1.31
$1.32
$1.45
$1.21
$1.23
$1.25
$1.26
$1.28
$1.40
$1.17
$1.19
$1.21
$1.22
$1.23
$1.35
$1.13
$1.15
$1.16
$1.18
$1.19
$1.30
$1.09
$1.10
$1.12
$1.13
$1.14
$1.25
$1.05
$1.06
$1.08
$1.09
$1.10
$1.20
$1.00
$1.02
$1.03
$1.05
$1.06
$1.15
$0.96
$0.98
$0.99
$1.00
$1.01
$1.10
$0.92
$0.93
$0.95
$0.96
$0.97
$1.05
$0.88
$0.89
$0.90
$0.91
$0.92
$1.00
$0.84
$0.85
$0.86
$0.87
$0.88

This solution, based on traditional property rights principles,
would enable the government to “recapture” the spectrum at a small
fraction of the $1.02–$1.22 Mhz/POP it could get for the spectrum if
reauctioned for mobile broadband. The difference could yield a
profit to the U.S. Treasury of approximately $28.5 billion to $38.3
billion after paying $3.4 billion to $6.4 billion to provide affected
viewers with a subsidized alternative and to compensate the
broadcasters if 120 Mhz is auctioned. See Exhibit 6 below for a
breakdown of this analysis.

Although the National Broadband Plan recommends initially
109
reallocating only 120 Mhz of broadcasting spectrum, it is possible
the auction of television spectrum could be combined with auctions of
other spectrum to reach the FCC’s goal of 500 Mhz for mobile
broadband services by 2020. This would increase the auction size and
the impact of the elasticity of demand. Alternatively, the government
109. Spectrum, supra note 7, at 2.

2012]

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE BROADCASTING SPECTRUM

185

may divide the auction into multiple smaller ones that could reduce
such impact. The eminent domain solution could be also used as a
principled solution for the government to reclaim additional
television broadcast spectrum in the future.

VII. Conclusion: All Roads Lead to an
Eminent Domain Framework
The government must determine an effective strategy for
reallocating spectrum in order to make broadband more readily
available and also generate significant revenue for the U.S. Treasury.
The challenge is to find a reasonable and efficient mechanism for
removing the television broadcasters from the spectrum. For political
and strategic reasons, the government has effectively conceded
certain property rights to the television broadcasters through its
statements that it will rely on a “voluntary” transition process to
reclaim its television broadcasting spectrum and reallocate it for
mobile broadband use. The government needs to implement a
solution that appears “fair” to television broadcasters and also
ensures large blocks of contiguous spectrum for mobile broadband
and does not waste government assets. The only solution that meets
all of these needs is a buyout of the broadcasters at the market value
of their spectrum assets—a price that can be reduced through
continued must-carry privileges and other options. Given that the
government has effectively conceded (or has decided to act as though
it is conceding) certain property rights, an eminent domain and
zoning model is a convenient and tested framework to effect such a
solution. Nevertheless, the government’s ability to curtail the
broadcasters’ spectrum rights by “down zoning” their licenses would
provide a meaningful threat (the “stick”) to encourage the television
broadcasters to accept a fair market offer from the government (the
“carrot”).
The television broadcasters are a politically powerful group.
They are certain to resist any transaction that does not yield a
substantial premium for them despite the lack of a convincing
argument that they are entitled to any property rights after their
current licenses expire. A politically influenced payment that slightly
exceeds fair market value may be the most expeditious solution to
moving the television broadcasters off the spectrum to make room for
the higher value mobile broadband applications, which will ultimately
benefit society as a whole. This result would further the societal goals
of obtaining more readily available broadband and generating
revenue for the U.S. government while placating the potential
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concerns of the broadcasters and viewers. Moreover, it would enable
the government to avoid probable prolonged litigation over property
rights, and preserve incentives for communications providers to invest
in FCC licenses and build out new services.
Longer term, however, the government needs to think about how
to avoid situations where it is forced to buy back its own assets which
it previously had not sold or intentionally given away.

